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Problems in Using 
International Trade to 
Counter Terrorism: 
The Case of Pakistan 
Robert Looney• 
Even before the smoke had settled from the September 11 attacks in 
New York and Washington, United States Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick launched a series of speeches arguing that global trade liberal-
ization was a central plank of the counter-offensive against terrorism. In 
a thoughtful essay, "Countering Terror With Trade" Zoellick's main 
.premise was that:1 
America's trade leadership can build a coalition of countries .. . Open 
markets are vital for developing nations, many of ~them fragile 
democracies that rely on the international economy to -overcome 
poverty and create opportunity; we need answers for those who ask 
for economic hope to counter internal threats to our common val-
ues. To address the relatioq.ship between trade agreements and 
other international objectives the President has proposed that we 
build on openness and growth in developing countries with a tool 
box of cooperative policies. 
As Tonelson notes, "trade policy as anti-terror weapon is an under-
standably appealing idea It doesn't put American soldiers in hann's 
way. It is nonviolent, market-friendly and holds the promise of 'drain-
ing the ·swamp' where terrorists are assumed to thrive. And it doesn't 
require a line in the federal budget 2" 
*Robert E. Looney is a professor of economics, and Associate Chairman of 
the NationaJ Security Affairs department at the Naval Postgraduate Schoo), 
Monterey, CA. He has written twenty books on various aspects of develop-
ment together with articles appearing in a number of scholarly journals. 
'Zoellick, Robert B, "Countering Terror With Trade" The Washington Post, 
September 20, 2001, A35. 
2Tonelson, Alan, "There's Only So Much That Foreign Trade Can Do" 
Washington Post, June 2, 2002, BI. 
United States Trade Responses to 9/11 
Early on after 9/ 11 it looked as if the Bush Administration would add 
trade policy to its anti-terrorism arsenal In fact, two weeks after 9/ 1 l 
the Senate passed a bill approving a free trade agreement withjordan, 
the first of its kind with an Arab nation. 
"'Some experts see in these events two possible futures for the Islamic 
world, and a role for the West in determining which one is realized. 
That role is to help Islamic countries create material hope for their peo-
ple. " 3 
In another major post 9/11 trade initiative, President Bush set out last 
fall to assist the Pakistani economy as part of an effort to reward the 
country for joining the US campaign against Osama bin Laden and the 
Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan. The idea was simple: 
Support Pakistan's economy by easing the tariffs and quotas on imports 
of Pakistan-made textiles and apparel. Th~ more Pakistanis who have 
decent jobs, the fewer potential recruits for Islamic extremists trying to 
destabilize the pro-American government of President Pervez 
Musharraf. Optimistic Pakistanis saw this as a potential grand gesture 
toward their country, similar to the 50 percent increase in textile quotas 
that the first Bush Administration granted to Turkey as a reward for its 
help in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 
Rational of U.S. Thade Policy towards Pakistan 
The economic rational behind increasing quotas and reducing tariffs 
is quite logical and compelling. The starting point is what is often called 
the neoclassical theory of comparative advantage. Basically this theory 
states that countries have a comparative advantage in exporting those 
products that use relatively large amounts of their most abundant 
resources (land, labor capital, technology etc.). In Pakistan's case the 
relatively large amounts of semi skilled workers should guarantee rela-
tively low wages (and hence low costs) in those processes using this type 
of factor. The result would be an increase in the country's ability to offer 
these products at low pri~es in international markets. Under these con-
ditions, increased US trade with Pakistan would increase employment 
in the country's large strategically important textile sector. 
3Khan,Joseph "A Business Plan for Islam Inc." The New York Times December 
30, 2001 http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidinthenews/ articles/nyt-123001.html 
2 
The advantage of this approach also stems from the fact that that 
many workers in Pakistan feel that they get no benefit from the aid or 
debt relief the US provides the Pakistani government. The most direct 
lin~ from the US to the :Pakistani population is often perceived by the 
population at large as that through direct employment in sectors such 
as textiles. 
The Pakistani textile industry which took off in the 1980s employs 3.5 
million, about 60 percent of the industrial workforce. These figures 
understate the sector's importance because textiles create linkages for 
income generation all through the economy. Much of the cotton used 
in making Pakistani gannents is growth here. The Faisalabad market is 
one of the largest yard markets in Asia. If there is a shortfall anywhere 
in the chain it affects everyone's income. 
President Bush's trade initiatives to assist the Pakistani Textile sector 
were made even more imperative by events immediately following 
9/11: insurance companies began charging exorbitant premiums for 
shipments out of Pakistan; American textile buyers refused to venture 
into a potential war zone and cold-footed manufacllll"es reduced their 
orders. As a result, textile exports to the United States - about 80 per-
cent of Pakistan's total U.S. exports - dropped by 40 percent. By 
December an estimated 48, 000 workers had lost their textile jobs. As 
one observer noted "that's 48,000 more Pakistanis with nothing to do 
but take to the streets, cheer on Osama bin Laden and burn the 
American flag", or as the former manager of a dosed textile plant 
grimly noted "An empty belly is a breeding ground for all sports of bad 
ideas."~ 
Congressional Impediments 
But in an example of how the tempestuous politics of trade on Capitol 
HilJ can upset U.S. foreign policy aims, the plan to help Pakistani 
exporters ran aground, victim of a lobbying campaign by the USA's 
own battered textile industry.5 While President Bush has obtained 
authorization from Congress to negotiate new trade deals, Congress is 
sharply divided over trade politics. While there are notable exceptions, 
'Quotea in Paul Wiseman and James Cox "Competing Interests Tangle 
Textile Policy" USA Today April l, 2002 
http:/lwww.usatoday.com/money/ covers/2002-04·02-pakistani-textile.htm 
sBrainard, Lael, "Textiles and Terrorism" New l'Ork Times December 27 2001 
At9. ' 
3 
Republicans tend to support more open markets, while many 
Democrats try to protect such industries as steel and textiles from being 
overwhelmed by cheap imports. Many Democrats support the use of 
trade sanctions to enforce social goals such as higher labor and envi-
ronmental standards abroad, while most Republicans reject these sanc-
tions as protectionism. 
Over the last 40 years or so the United States trade policy has sought 
to limit imports of textiles from countries with cheap labor. Since 1996 
the WfO has heard three textile cases against the U.S. policy. In 1996, 
the wro ruled against us quotas limiting imports of Costa Rican 
widerwear; the next year, the trade body ruled against U.S. quotas on 
wool shirts from India. Ironically in early 2001 the U.S. lost its third big 
textiles trade case as a World Trade Organization panel ruled that a U.S. 
quota on Pakistani cloth violates global trade rules. 
To make their case for special treatment in the U.S. market Pakistani 
manufacturers formed a lobbying group and hired US lawyers and pub-
lic relations consultants. They hoped fro trade concessions worth per-
haps $400 million a year. They argued that reducing trade barriers 
wouldn't threaten jobs in the American South, the heart of the U.S. tex-
tile and apparel industry. They said they compete not against U.S. firms 
but against mills in countries such as South Africa,Jordan and Kenya, 
which enjoy easier access to the U.S. markel Pakistan ranked 21st last 
year in U.S. apparel imports with less than 2% of the market. 
But the U.S. textile and apparel makers and their powerful patrons in 
Congress weren't to budge. They pointed out that Pakistan's own tar-
iffs on textile and apparel imports are so high that, in some cases, they 
violate international trade rules. And Pakistani cotton subsidies were so 
lavish that American cotton was priced out of Caribbean garment fac-
tories. 
Failed Outcome 
In the end the U.S. textile lobby and its congressional supporters were 
a formidable adversary and won the day. During Musharrafs mid-
February visit to Washington, President Bush announced that in addi-
tion to offering $1 billion in debt relief to Pakistan, the United States 
would increase its quotas in specific import categories in a package 
worth $142 million, in 2002, $158 million in 2003 and $178 million in 
2004. That is around a third of what Pakistan wanted . . 
4 
Pakistani mill owners complained that the as part of the agreement 
U.S. tended to raise their quotas in categories they didn't much need. 
In the most eye-catching example, the U.S. raised Pakistan's quota for 
woven blouses for women and girls, a category in which Pakistan used 
only 18% of its 2001 quota. 
The outcome also provided both countries with a hard lesson about 
the workings of present day globalization. The fact is that in an 
increasingly globalizing economy market forces are such that modem 
corporations show little loyalty to any particular country or workforce, 
but adapt quickly as they seek the most profitable and cost-effective 
locations from which to conduct business. This case shows how such 
moves can have geopolitical consequences: Even though no evidence 
suggests that U.S. companies were driven by an animus toward 
Pakistan, their actions galled many in that country because they came 
at a time when Islamabad has provided vital backing to the U.S. led 
coalition against terrorism. 
In addition there are several real ironies here. The U.S. textile indus-
try spent millions of dollars lobbying to retain quotas even though they 
have to be phased out in 2005. More specifically, under ·world Trade 
Organization rules, the textile quotas of Pakistan and many other 
American trading partners, including India, were automatically raised 
by an additional 12 per cent at the start of this year, part of a process 
that is to lead to the global elimination of textile quotas by 2005. 6 
On the other side, Pakistan has fought hard to expand their quota in 
the US market even though it is not clear that after 2005 tliey will be 
competitive even in their own domestic market 
Policy Failure in Pakistan 
There are several factors at work here. Poor policy making on both 
the part of the government and the companies has burdened the indus-
try with high costs and a limited line of products. In addition the coun-
try's relatively slow pace of globalization, especially in the 1990s has 
resulted in little innovation and productive investment. 
6Mujahid, Haroon, "Understanding WfO Framework" Pakistan & Gulf 
&onomistJuly 23, 2001 http:/ / www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue2001/ 
issue30/etc4.htm 
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The prestigious Pakistan and Gulf Economist has noted that7 "(While) 
the textile sector contributes the highest percentage in total exports of 
the country, the main products are yam, grey fabrics and low and medi-
um quality goods. The average unit price realization is often below the 
world average. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) policies have 
always been, even today, influenced by certain pressure groups. The 
result is: glut of locally produced yam, inadequate and inefficient weav-
ing, processing and manufacturing facilities. The exponential expansion 
of spinning capacity has been done at the cost of other sub-sectors 
adding the highest value. For this dismal economic situation the eco-
nomic managers are responsible . . . our failure was due to inability to 
cater to the needs of the market. "8 One result is that the country has 
tended to rely increasingly on a few products and on exports with stag-
nating unit values, in contrast to the most successful Asian countries. 
Government Policies have also been misguided in other ways. Textile 
firms have been forced to rely on the medium staple cotton grown in 
Pakistan. While this takes advantage of Pakistan's static comparative 
advantage in production of cotton, it does little to enhance Pakistan's 
export growth prospects, or to reduce its dependence on a single com-
modity. The narrow product lines also made it more difficult for the 
U.S. to come up with a quota reduction plan that was acceptable to the 
domestic textile lobby. 
Until recently the textile industry benefited from cheap cotton at the 
expense of cotton growers through the cotton export tax and export 
restrictions that were eventually relaxed during the 1990s. Perhaps more 
significantly, high import tariffs (25 percent to 35 percent) on imports of 
semi-manufactured textile inputs - particularly protection on polyester 
which remains at 25 percent - coupled with poorly functioning import 
duty and sales tax rebate schemes have been a major obstacle to 
improved export performance and diversification. They penalize the 
industry for any attempt to expand beyond the narrow and low quality 
range of yarn and doth produced locally 
In this light the phasing out of quotas in 2005 confronts the sector with 
both a risk and an opportunity. The risk is that Pakistan's main textile 
exporters will no doubt need to undertake considerable investment · 
'Kazmi, Shabbir H, "Textile Ministry Need of the Day" Pakistan & Gulf 




improved production techniques and technology or find themselves 
highly vulnerable to low cost Chinese and other developing country 
imports. 
Here there is room for concern. The investment climate in Pakistan 
has in thb recent past been characterized by frequent unanticipated pol-
icy changes, exacerbated by domestic and regional political instability. 
Pakistani and foreign industrialists often cite this as an important con-
tributing factor to the decline in domestic and foreign investment in the 
country. Policy uncertainty was in part a function of the mounting debt 
crisis of 1990s but it also stemmed from policy slippages and reversals 
by successive governments throughout the decade. While the current 
goyemment is trying to provide more stability, domestic terrorist 
threats, potential conflict with India and uncertainty over the policies of 
the next (post October 2002) Administration have just about brought 
new capital formation to a halt The outlook for a major influx of 
investment and technology transfer to the industry is extremely grim. 
Finally with regard to globalization and the country's piace in the 
world economy, impressive strides were made in the 1990.s in creating 
a more open economy. The average import tariff declined to just over 
20 percent in 2001-02, which is less than half its level in the rnid-1990s. 
Other barriers to trade such as exchange market distortions and non-
tariff barriers have also been reduced. However this action falls short 
of the reductions in protection made by the countries such as Indonesia, 
Mexico, ad Philippines with which Pakistan competes in world markets 
for labor intensive products. 
The result has been a long period of Pakistan loosing ground to many 
of its current and likely future competitors. In terms of openness to 
trade and international market forces, a major determinant of interna-
tional competitiveness, Pakistan despite the lowering of tariffs and trade 
restricti~ns noted above, has even experienced a relative decline (Chart 
I} with regard to other countries since the late 1980s. At the same ti.me 
other South Asian countries, India and Sri Lanka have shown a slight 
improvement. No doubt this pattern is reflective of many of the gov-
ernment's policies towards the textile industry noted above. 
Similarly, . the overall globalization of Pakistan and South Asian 
regions has also declined during this period with regard to both the 
advanced countries and those in East Asia (Chart 2). The implications 
for Pakistan are dire. At a time when Pakistan needs to increase its 
7 
competitiveness it is coming off a long period of declining ability to 
compete in the new world of global markets free of quotas and subsi-
dies. 
Main Lessons for Countering Terror with Trade 
While the Pakistan example illustrates some of the problems involved 
in countering terrorism through the use of international trade policies, 
it is only one example and no doubt unique in some respects. 
Nevertheless, it can serve as the basis for several tentative policy pre-
scriptions: 
1. Regardless of how well-intended, the President of the U.S. should 
not make broad economic promises that require Congressional 
approval, especially in cases where adversely effected domestic interests 
are well organized. 
2. Do not try to speed up formal processes that are in place. WfO 
textile schedule for 2005 is a good example--this only alienates other 
countries. 
3. Do not expect to quickly reverse or significantly modify long stand-
ing adverse trends in the world economy or globalization. In Pakistan's 
case rapidly moving to freer trade may create more instability than sta-
bility. . 
4. While standard economic theory provides guidance as to compar-
ative advantage and thus efficient trading patterns, government policy 
distortions can neutralize or negate this advantage. 
5. Do not look to simple solutions to complex problems - Pakistan's 
textile problems probably can not be resolved with increased quotas. 
The solution is investment in new growing areas, not trying to hang on 
to capacity that is unlikely to be competitive without continued subsi-
dies and/ or protectionism. 
6. Do look to innovative approaches. Here for example, the U.S inter-
ests wou}d probably be better served through the provision of some sort 
of political risk insurance/investment guarantees to US/Pakistani finns 
in the textile sector. 
7. No doubt much of the aid and debt relief sent to P~stan should 
have been u.Sed to directly support the textile sector, especially in the 
interval of falling orders right after 9/ 1 l. 
If Pakistan had been a country with years of good governance, expe-
riencing strong, stable investment· patterns, while rmdergoing increased 
8 
openness and globalization and possessing a highly literate workforce, 
standard economic theory would have been relevant. The environment 
would have been much more conduce to the effective use of trade poli-
cies to fight terrorism. In short, the Congressional watering down of the 
President's tariff/ quota initiative toward that country might not have 
been the disaster it first appeared to be. 





>< 0 41 
'tl 
................ " "' ..s 








_. 4 . 
... .. 4 I'll 
,;., ....... --.- ...... --..... ·· "-. ~ -1.5 -- ...... 
.,. ___ , 
-2 
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
OpenneS$ Dimension 
--o-Pakistan __ ..._ __ India - Sri Lanka ····-··· Pakistan Trend 
Notes: Factor analysis was used to define globalization and its main 
dimension, openness are given in Looney (2002); Output= trend in 
Pakistani openness.9 Vertical scale is for a sample of 60 cormtries. It has 
a mean of zero; hence countries with negative scores score relatively 
low in their attainment of world economic integration. 
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